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Abstract
Research and development (R&D) collaborations are
horizontal agreements among firms to join forces in
their inventive activities. As in the context of the recent COVID-19 global pandemic, such collaborations
are often promoted with an argument of increased R&D
productivity. In numerous contexts, especially when
marginal production costs are low, such as for medications or for software, the consumers’ surplus depends
critically on the best-performing product available on
the market, for—all else equal—this product will tend
to take a dominant position. Using a simple two-stage
model of innovation and subsequent product commercialization on a market with heterogeneous consumers,
we show that a noncollaborative patent race with patent
protection (for the best product) provides strong innovation incentives, leading to better performing products than a regime of noncollaborative research without patent protection or of collaborative research (with
profit sharing).

are such that the economic agents participating in the
research have maximal incentives to exert effort. Given
that the cost of experimentation does not vary much as
a function of R&D participation (at least in the shortrun), our pursuit here is to track the economic incentives
when experimentation occurs in a group or individually,
by keeping in mind that the performance of the product
is key for consumer surplus (at a given price).

1.1

Literature

The classical understanding by Schumpeter [20] is that
a firm’s role is to develop production methods to satisfy
its consumers’ demand. The neoclassical view of R&D,
as summarized by Nelson [17], purports that firms need
to obtain intellectual property rights to be able to appropriate the benefits of their research, thus resulting in a
winner-takes-all patent race.1 The supra-normal rents
from successful inventions provide in turn strong incentives to invest in inventive activities.2 Since firms may
for various reasons not be able to by themselves exploit
many of the inventions they make [21], incentives arise
for them to share or license their new technologies as
1 Introduction
part of what eventually becomes collaborative innovaCollaborative research is en vogue, and has even become tion.3 Indeed, Allen [1] proposes that in addition to
a public necessity. In the face of the recent COVID- public institutions, private firms, and individual inven19 global pandemic governments called on industry to tors, there is a fourth source of new inventions which he
unite so as to produce a vaccine in the shortest possi- terms the “collective invention” that results from close
ble timeframe. Clearly, in the case of an infectious dis- contacts, voluntary disclosure, and imitation of work
ease with the potential to cripple the global economy, practices. Instead of unintended knowledge dissipation,
the quality of a vaccine the “great coronavirus collabo- these spillovers may be desirable, as they might reduce
ration” [9] may come up with is of utmost importance. the collective experimentation cost. Collaborative inSince when searching for alternatives the expected best- novation is therefore not an accidental byproduct, but
performance alternative increases with the aggregate ef- rather operationalized intentionally, by means of coopfort put into the venture, it is important that incentives erative R&D agreements or cross-licensing deals among
1 See,

e.g., Reinganum [18] for a summary of classical results on the dynamics of innovation competition.
investments may sometimes even exceed the socially optimal amount of R&D expenditures; see Prop. 10 (i).
3 Foray [11, Ch. 3] mentions further reasons for R&D collaboration, such as cost sharing, avoidance of redundancies, economies of specialization, as well as the need for reducing uncertainties associated with modular subsystems—best accomplished across firm boundaries. In
addition, especially small firms may benefit from knowledge complementarities that arise in physical proximity to other firms and institutions
in the same geographical area [8], while other firms may overcome distance barriers by mobility and alliance formation [19].
4 The logic advanced here is motivated by the cooperation that can arise in a repeated stage game (such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [2]), due
to the folk theorem [12, 13]. Yet even in a one-time interaction, the Coase theorem points to the possibility of Pareto-optimal outcomes in the
presence of complete information and well-defined property rights [6].
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different firms that may be otherwise competing [14].4
Collaboration on innovation works particularly well
with modular systems where design problems can be
isolated and individual contributions integrated into the
full system, thus allowing for economies of specialization [3]; see also footnote 3. There is empirical evidence that external collaboration incentives (as part of
a government program) may induce improvements in
innovative performance, for example, in Germany [7].
Finally, by extending the notion of research partners to
users and other semi-interested parties, collaborative innovation takes on the meaning of “open innovation” (a
term coined by Chesbrough [5]), arguably leading to a
paradigm shift in the procurement of new ideas [4] and a
“commercialization” of external resources [23] with its
own processes and infrastructure [10].

1.2

Research Question

Standing on the shoulders of giants (represented by the
extant literature), our goal in this paper is quite modest.
Using a simple, and arguably neoclassical, model we ask
whether collaborative research makes sense from the
point of view of joint experimentation, without resorting to additional “out-of-the-box” qualitative arguments
to justify cooperation (such as those in footnote 3). This
echoes the critique by Mowery [15] voiced more than
two decades ago, that despite a proliferation of research
collaborations (in his analysis at the industry-university
interface), only a moderate success is visible—a phenomenon that is driven at least in part by self-interest
(e.g., universities’ potentially over-emphasizing their
participation in the intellectual property rights derived
from joint innovations).

1.3

Contribution

As emphasized in neoclassical economics, the selfinterest of economic agents (in the absence of psychological biases and bounded rationality) is a reliable predictor for their behavior. The model for inventive activity we employ here is that of sequential search for
the most beneficial alternative, in the spirit of Weitzman
[22]. Firms need to address heterogeneous market needs
and therefore compete on quality and price, whereby the
top-performing product (in terms of its quality) may or
may not be eligible for intellectual property protection.
Our simple finding is that by and large, there are no economic incentives for collaborative innovation unless intellectual property regimes are weak and experimentation costs are neither too small nor too large. In particular, when the best technology can be independently

evaluated as such and patented, research competition is
“healthy” in the sense that it provides the strongest innovation incentives, which for large experimentation costs
results in R&D activity that falls short of the socially optimal levels of experimentation, yet is prone to exceed
the latter when the cost of experimentation is small.

1.4

Outline

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2 describes the basic setup of the two-period model,
including sequential experimentation by firms in the innovation phase and their pricing decisions in the commercialization phase. We derive the equilibria in various
noncooperative settings (with and without patent protection), as well as in a collaborative setting. In Sec. 3, we
examine the social planner’s most preferred outcome,
which leads to a comparison of all regimes in Sec. 4.
Finally, Sec. 5 concludes.

2

Model

Consider two firms, 1 and 2, that at time t = 0 (“innovation phase”) can invest in conducting experiments.
At time t = 1, the firms set prices so as to sell their innovations to consumers with heterogeneous preferences
(“commercialization phase”); see Fig. 1.
In the innovation phase, firm i’s product quality qi
is determined by the outcome of the best of ni experiments, for i ∈ {1, 2}. The random outcomes of the
experiments are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) uniformly on the (normalized) quality space Q =
[0, 1]. Higher outcomes indicate a better quality (e.g.,
in terms of treatment benefit for a cure, or performance
for a durable good such as software). The cost of each
experiment is c > 0. An “experiment” consists of a
discrete research and development (R&D) effort, which
could amount to a test configuration, a prototype, or any
other costly effort that would determine the likely product quality in the event of commercialization.5

Figure 1: Timeline.
In the commercialization phase (i.e., at time t = 1),
the firms set prices so as to maximize their respective
profits from selling the imperfectly substitutable products to a heterogeneous consumer base.6 Each consumer

5 The

quality itself may be random, in which case qi represents the expected performance value.
products are imperfectly substitutable because their qualities (i.e., performance characteristics) are generically different. Indeed, the
probability for the two firms’ products to exhibit equivalent performance characteristics (i.e., q1 = q2 ) is zero.
7 In this widely used linear utility representation u, the consumer’s type θ can be considered as his marginal utility for quality [16].
6 The
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of type θ has utility u(pi , qi ; θ) = θqi − pi if he buys a
good of quality qi and price pi , otherwise his utility is
zero.7 Consumer types θ are uniformly distributed on
the (normalized) type space Θ = [0, 1], and the total
number of consumers is normalized to one. Assume that
the marginal cost of producing a good is zero. This assumption serves to simplify the analysis and holds to a
very good approximation for products whose total costs
are mainly frontloaded by the required R&D expenditures, but that are relatively cheap to produce (at a small
marginal cost) in the commercialization phase, such as
pharmaceuticals or computer software.
The innovation phase and the commercialization
phase are now discussed in turn, starting with the latter.

2.1

fairly robust prediction of market prices at the productcommercialization stage.

Product Commercialization

The firms’ best experimental outcomes define their
respective quality levels, q1 and q2 . Let qH =
max{q1 , q2 } be the quality of the “flagship” top performer and qL = min{q1 , q2 } be the “generic” runnerFigure 2: Market segments with demands DH , DL .
up quality. The heterogeneous quality levels offered
on the product market, together with the firms’ chosen Proposition 2. The (profit-maximizing) firms’ Nashprice levels, pH and pL , segment the consumer base.
equilibrium prices are
Proposition 1. Given the qualities qH , qL (with 0 <
2qH (qH − qL )
p∗H =
,
qL < qH ≤ 1) and prices pH , pL (with 0 ≤ pL <
4qH − qL
pH ≤ 1), consumers with types in ΘH = [θ1 , 1] purchase the flagship product (of quality qH ), those with and
qL (qH − qL )
types in ΘL = [θ0 , θ1 ] purchase the generic product
,
p∗L =
4qH − qL
(of quality qL ), and the remaining consumers with types
in Θ0 = [0, θ0 ] do not purchase at all, where θ0 = given the realized qualities qL , qH (with 0 ≤ qL <
pL /qL ∈ Θ0 ∩ ΘL and θ1 = (pH − pL )/(qH − qL ) ∈ qH ≤ 1).
ΘL ∩ ΘH are “marginal” types.8
Proof. Given the market segments in Prop. 1 (defined
Proof. Let firm H be the firm offering the flagship prod- by θ0 and θ1 ), firm H’s profit is ΠH = (1 − θ1 )pH and
uct of quality qH and firm L be the firm offering the firm L’s profit is ΠL = (θ1 − θ0 )pL . Thus, the firms’
generic product of quality qL . The marginal consumer best-response functions are
who is indifferent between choosing the product of qual(qH − qL ) + pL
pH qL
ity qH and the product of quality qL is therefore of
bH (pL ) =
, and bL (pH ) =
,
type θ1 such that u(pH , qH ; θ1 ) = u(pL , qL ; θ1 ), so
2
2qH
θ1 = (pH − pL )/(qH − qL ) as claimed. Similarly,
the marginal consumer indifferent between purchasing which implies the Nash-equilibrium prices
nothing and buying the generic product is such that
2qH (qH − qL )
p∗H = bH (bL (p∗H )) =
,
0 = u(0, 0; θ0 ) = u(pL , qL ; θ0 ), whence θ0 = pL /qL ,
4qH − qL
which concludes our proof.
and
The market segments (see Fig. 2) imply the firms’
qL (qH − qL )
p∗L = bL (bH (p∗L )) =
,
profits as a function of their pricing decisions, which
4qH − qL
in turn allows them to anticipate each other’s best responses. The intersection of the firms’ best responses as claimed.
to the opponents’ price choices yields a unique Nash- Proposition 3. The firms’ Nash-equilibrium profits are
equilibrium strategy profile. The resulting equilibrium
2
prices p∗H and p∗L , which depend on the realized per4qH
(qH − qL )
∗
Π
(q
,
q
)
=
,
H
L
H
formance levels qH and qL , can be considered as a
(4qH − qL )2
8 Marginal

types are indifferent between two purchase decisions; their overall likelihood of occurrence in the type space Θ vanishes.
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Z

and
Π∗L (qH , qL )

qH qL (qH − qL )
,
=
(4qH − qL )2

at time t = 1, given the realized qualities qL , qH (with
0 ≤ qL < qH ≤ 1).

=

1

νy ν−1

0

and
θ0∗

2qH − qL
∈ (0, 1),
4qH − qL

qH − qL
=
∈ (0, θ1∗ ).
4qH − qL

1


nxn−1 dx dy =

y

n
.
n+ν

With patent protection, its expected payoff becomes 10
Z 1

Z
1 1 ν−1
νy
nxn dx dy − cn,
Π̄∗i =
4 0
y

Proof. The marginal consumers in equilibrium (denoted
by θ0 = θ0∗ and θ1 = θ1∗ ) are obtained by combining the which is equal to
Z
results in Prop. 1 and Prop. 2:
n
θ1∗ =

Z

4(n + 1)

1


νy ν−1 1 − y n+1 dy − cn,

0

or, more simply put:
Π̄∗i =

n
− cn.
4(n + ν + 1)

Proposition 4. With patent protection, each firm i ∈
{1, 2} conducts in equilibrium 11
√


1 + 1 + 32 c 1
∗
ni (c) =
−
Remark 1. The firms’ pricing decisions are strategic
32 c
2 +
complements, as their best-response functions (see bH
and bL in the proof of Prop. 2) are increasing: each experiments.
firm prefers to set a higher price as the other firm in- Proof. Maximizing Π̄∗i with respect to n leads to the
creases its price. As a result, there would be an advan- first-order necessary optimality condition
tage to move second when choosing a price. That is,
ν+1
− c = 0,
the ability to commit to a price before the other firm
4(n + ν + 1)2
is not desirable in this price-setting game. Each firm
would want to adjust its price after the other firm has and, similarly, maximizing Π̄∗j with respect to ν leads to
moved. Hence, the Nash-equilibrium outcome of the the first-order necessary optimality condition
simultaneous-move game as given in the previous ren+1
− c = 0,
sults can be considered as fairly robust with respect to
4(n + ν + 1)2
additional strategic actions the firms might take in order
to influence the pricing decisions. Here, given the Nash- provided c is small enough (so as to allow for a nonnegequilibrium prices p∗H and p∗L , no firm has a unilateral ative solution). The symmetric solution to the preceding
two equations (including the possibility of a corner soincentive to change its price.
lution with zero innovation),
√


1 + 1 + 32 c 1
2.2 Noncooperative Innovation
n∗i (c) = n∗j (c) =
,
−
32 c
2 +
To determine the level of innovation in a noncooperative setting we need to answer the question of how many for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, constitutes the unique Nash
experiments n∗ (c) would each firm want to conduct at equilibrium of the firms’ simultaneous-move “innovatime t = 0 in equilibrium? The answer generally de- tion game.”
pends on whether the firm with the higher-performance
Without patent protection, on the other hand, firm i’s
product can claim patent protection and exercise the
right to exclude the other firm, thus effectively limiting expected payoff is
Z
qL to zero.9
∗
Π̂
=
nν
xn−1 y ν−1 π ∗ (x, y) d(x, y) − cn,
i
The probability that the outcome of the best of n exThis implies the given expressions for the firms’ equilibrium profits at time t = 1.

[0,1]2

periments does not exceed x ∈ [0, 1] is xn . Thus, if
firm j conducts ν experiments and firm i 6= j conducts n where the commercialization profits, as a function of the
12
experiments, the probability of firm i winning the inno- realized performance tuple (x, y), is
vation race with a higher-quality product is
π ∗ (x, y) = Π∗H (x, y)1{x>y} + Π∗L (y, x)1{x≤y} ,
P (max{x̃1 , . . . , x̃n } ≥ max{ỹ1 , . . . , ỹν })

and where 1{·} denotes the indicator function.

9 Instead

of forcing qL = 0, an alternative modeling scenario might limit the low quality qL to a positive value, representing the quality of
a freely available generic product, somewhat reducing the incentives to win the patent race for the innovators.
10 Here we use the fact that by Prop. 3, Π∗ (x, 0) = x/4 and Π∗ (y, 0) = 0, for all (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 .
H
L
11 For any real number α, the expression [α] , max{0, α} denotes the positive part of α.
+
12 The definition of π ∗ along the diagonal x = y of the square [0, 1]2 does not affect the value of Π̂∗ .
i
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Proposition 5. Without patent protection, each firm
i ∈ {1, 2} conducts in equilibrium


∗
c
n̂i (c) = R
n̂∗ (c)−1 ∗
∗
i

Proof. Note first that the firms’ joint profit is
Π = ΠH + ΠL = (1 − θ1 ) pH + (θ1 − θ0 ) pL ,

with the marginal types θ0 , θ1 defining the market segments as in Prop. 1. To maximize Π with respect to the
price tuple (pH , pL ), the first-order necessary optimality
experiments.13
conditions are


Proof. Maximizing firm i’s expected commercializapH − pL
∂Π
=
1
−
2
= 0,
tion payoff Π̂∗i with respect to n, leads to the first-order
∂pH
qH − qL


optimality condition (satisfied at any interior optimum
∂Π
pH qL − pL qH
where n̂∗i (c) > 0),
= 2
= 0.
∂pL
(qH − qL )qL
[0,1]2

Z

(xy)

π (x,y)(1+n̂i (c) ln(x)) d(x,y)

∗

(xy)n̂i (c)−1 π ∗ (x, y)(1+n̂∗i (c) ln(x)) d(x, y) =
[0,1]2

+

c
, By the joint concavity of Π with respect to (pH , pL ),15
n̂∗i (c)

n̂∗i (c).

where we have (by symmetry) replaced ν with
This condition is equivalent to the claimed relation. The
relation in footnote 13 is obtained from that same condition by separating n̂∗i (c) from the integral expressions as
much as possible, leading to a quadratic equation.

There are two conflicting effects when comparing
the situation without patent protection to the situation
with patent protection: without patent protection, conditional on obtaining the better product a firm’s expected
payoffs are lower, and conditional on losing the innovation race the firm’s expected payoffs are higher. In either case, the value of winning the patent race decreases.
Thus, one could expect a decrease in the equilibrium
experimentation levels which are then closer to socially
optimal levels. All else equal, the firms ex post prefer
to have patent protection for the best innovation. This
regime clearly provides strong incentives for privatesector inventive activity.

2.3

Collaborative Innovation

If the firms cooperate at the R&D stage and run their experiments jointly based on a profit-sharing agreement,
what would be the optimal number of experiments to
run? To answer this question, we assume that the firms
maximize joint profits, which would be the case regardless of patent protection.14
Proposition 6. Given the qualities qH , qL (with 0 <
qL < qH ≤ 1), the firms’ joint profit is maximized at
∗∗
the “collaborative” price levels p∗∗
H = qH /2 and pL =
qL /2 for the flagship product and the generic product,
respectively. The firms’ optimal collaborative profit is
Π∗∗ (qL , qH ) = qH /4.
13 The

implicit expression is equivalent to n̂∗i (c) =

q

the preceding optimality conditions yield the unique
∗∗
maximizer (p∗∗
H , pL ) as specified. The collaborative
joint profit obtains by substituting the optimal collaborative prices in the firms’ joint profit Π.
Prop. 6 implies the marginal consumer types θ0∗∗ =
1/2 and θ1∗∗ = 1/2. In other words, when acting jointly
it is best for the firms to restrict product variety and commercialize only the top-performance flagship product.
This determines the incentives for the firms’ collaborative inventive activity.
Proposition 7. The firms’ optimal number of collaborative experiments is


1
∗∗
n (c) = √ − 1 ,
2 c
+
for all c > 0.
Proof. Given the firms’ optimal collaborative
profit Π∗∗ (x, y) = x/4 in Prop. 6 for a flagship quality
x ∈ [0, 1], the optimal number n∗∗ (c) of joint experiments maximizes their expected payoff at the beginning
of the innovation phase:
 Z 1

1
∗∗
n
n (c) ∈ arg max
nx dx − cn .
n≥0
4 0
The preceding optimization problem is equivalent to


n
− cn .
n∗∗ (c) ∈ arg max
n≥0
4(n + 1)
The solution can easily be obtained in closed form and
is as specified in Prop. 7.
The firms’ inventive activity is positive if and only
if the (positive) cost of experimentation is sufficiently
small, so c < 1/4.


R
∗
A2i + 4Bi c − Ai /2Bi , where Ai , [0,1]2 (xy)n̂i (c)−1 π ∗ (x, y) d(x, y) and

R
∗
Bi , [0,1]2 (xy)n̂i (c)−1 π ∗ (x, y) ln(x) d(x, y) depend on n̂∗i (c) > 0, defining a fixed-point problem, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
14 Intellectual property protection for the group of firms could be obtained in the form of a joint patent, or suitable cross-licensing agreements
may be put in place. None of the internal transfer agreements that may exist would a priori impact the firms’ joint profit expectations.
15 The trace of the Hessian is negative (equal to −2(1 + (q /q ))/(q − q )) and its determinant is positive (equal to 4/((q − q )q )),
H L
H
L
H
L L
indicating that both of its eigenvalues must be negative, thus establishing joint concavity of Π in (pH , pL ).
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3

Benchmark: Social Optimality

Given that the firms’ production cost is negligible compared to the product pricing, the social welfare amounts
simply to the gross consumer surplus, as the monetary
transfers between consumers and companies are irrelevant for the sum of benefits in the economy. Thus, given
the qualities qH , qL (with 0 < qL < qH ≤ 1) total welfare is
Z θ1
Z 1
W (qH , qL ) = qH
θ dθ + qL
θ dθ,
θ1

for all c > 0.
Proof. Since for any realized flagship quality x ∈ [0, 1],
the optimal social welfare is W FB = x/2, analogous to
the proof of Prop. 7 the socially optimal number of experiments nFB (c) solves

 Z 1
1
n
nx dx − cn ,
max
n≥0
2 0
or equivalently,

max

θ0

n≥0

where the marginal types θ0 , θ1 determine the demand
segments and are given in Prop. 1.

3.1

First-Best Pricing

While the magnitude of the monetary transfers from
consumers to producers does not affect the welfare in
the economy, the overall price and performance levels does affect the consumers’ gross surplus and thus
also the social planner’s objective function. A socially
optimal commercialization strategy would apply “firstbest” (i.e., welfare-maximizing) prices pFB
H (qH , qL ) and
(q
,
q
).
pFB
L H L
Proposition 8. The (socially optimal) first-best prices
are
FB
pFB
H = pL = 0,


n
− cn ,
2(n + 1)

which implies the given closed-form expression, for
all c > 0.
The firms’ rent-seeking behavior, when they use experimentation to obtain an advantage in the product market, leads to socially inefficiently high innovation. In
other words, many high-technology products may not
be the result of the firms’ responsiveness to real consumer needs but rather a consequence of a patent race
that promises each firm a chance of obtaining supranormal rents.

4

Comparison

In the noncooperative regime, let n∗ (c) = n∗1 (c)+n∗2 (c)
be the firms’ inventive activity with patent protection
independent of the realized qualities.
(see Prop. 4), and let n̂∗ (c) = n̂∗1 (c) + n̂∗2 (c) denote
their inventive activity without patent protection (see
Proof. Clearly, the gross consumer surplus is maxiProp. 5). When the firms collaborate, their joint invenmal if all consumers on the market consume the toptive activity is n∗∗ (c) (see Prop. 7), and finally, the soperformance product of quality qH . This outcome can
cially optimal (or first-best) inventive activity is given
be implemented if θ0 = θ1 = 0, which holds when both
by nFB (c) (see Prop. 9). The expected top-performance
prices vanish.
product quality in the market is strictly monotonic in the
FB
This implies W = qH /2. Since marginal produc- total experimentation the firms carry out. The latter cortion costs are approximately zero (by hypothesis), it is responds to their joint inventive activity in each of the
not surprising that the welfare-maximizing prices in the four different regimes.
product commercialization phase are also zero. How- Proposition 10. (i) (c − c ) (nFB (c) − n∗ (c)) > 0,
0
ever, such prices would not allow the firms to make up for all c ∈ (0, 1/2) \ {c } where c = 1/18.
0
0
their innovation cost, and in fact altogether destroy their (ii) min{nFB (c), n∗∗ (c)} > max{n̂∗ (c), n∗∗ (c)}, for all
incentives to create new products, as any positive R&D c ∈ (0, 1/4). (iii) n∗∗ (c) > n̂∗ (c) if any only if c ∈
expenditures could not be recouped.
(0, c ) ∪ (c , 1/4), where c ≈ 0.002 and c ≈ 0.086.
1

3.2

First-Best Experimentation

2

1

2

Proof. (i) From Prop. 4 and Prop. 9 we obtain that
nFB (c) > n∗ (c) if and only if
√




1 + 1 + 32c
1
√ −1 >
−1 ,
16c
2c
+
+

Given the implementation of a social optimum in the
commercialization phase, effectively maximizing gross
consumer surplus, the question arises as to a social planner’s incentives for innovation.

which (for c ∈ (0, 1/2)) is equivalent to:

Proposition 9. The (socially optimal) first-best number
of experiments is


1
nFB (c) = √ − 1 ,
2c
+

1
≈ 0.0556.
18
Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from an exhaustive numerical
inspection.
c > c0 =
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Prop. 10 states that the socially optimal inventive
activity exceeds the privately optimal inventive activity
for larger values of the experimentation cost (i.e., when
c > 1/18); see Fig. 3. Otherwise, private firms with
patent protection invest more in research and development than what may be socially optimal, but the quality
outcomes in that case are the highest. Furthermore, the
result implies that collaborative inventive activity with
patent protection is (when nonzero) always smaller than
noncollaborative inventive activity with patent protection. It is even smaller than noncollaborative inventive
activity without patent protection for small experimentation costs (i.e., c < c1 ≈ 0.002) and for larger experimentation costs (i.e., c > c2 ≈ 0.086); see Fig. 4.

5

Conclusion

Using a simple two-stage model we have shown that
short of a social planner imposing a welfare-maximizing
solution, noncooperative research with patent protection
of the best-performing invention leads to the strongest
R&D incentives, and thus also to the best expected output in terms of product quality. When experimentation
costs are sufficiently small, the resulting private incentives lead to inventive activity that exceeds the socially
optimal efforts, which in turn implies exceedingly highquality products. It is important to note that in reaching
these findings we have excluded all the standard out-ofthe-box explanations, which must therefore be essential to obtain an economically grounded rationale for
collaborative research. For example, if collaboration
can reduce the cost of experimentation (e.g., through
economies of specialization with modular subsystems;
see footnote 3), then there exists a cost reduction at
which the collaborative effort catches up to the noncooperative solution. However, it can easily be shown that
the required relative cost reduction from cooperation
approaches 100% as experimentation costs fall.16 This
generically disqualifies the cost-reduction argument for
collaborative research, at least in environments where
experiments can be conducted at relatively low cost.
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